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Introduction: The Business of State Capture in the Western Balkans* 
 




It is well known that the countries of the Western Balkans have been undergoing multiple, 
simultaneous and interconnected transitions – political, economic and post-war – for a 
generation. However, while the links between the political and the post-violent conflict 
transitions have been studied extensively over this period, the connections between the 
political and the economic, or among all three of these processes, have been less explored, 
leaving a gap in the understanding of the post-war political economy and its 
consequences. This special issue seeks to explore the region from this perspective, to 
begin to untangle the interplay of ineffective and incomplete political and economic 
reform on liberal democratic consolidation.  
In addition, there has been insufficient appreciation of the role that the non-violent yet 
significant frozen conflicts have had on political and social development, particularly (but 
not only) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or Bosnia), Kosovo and Macedonia. The 
contributions in this special issue all begin to explore this as well. Post-Dayton BiH and 
post-Ohrid Macedonia offer examples of unresolved structural, political and identity 
debates, less a result of essentialist grassroots urges than of dynamics that have been 
reified and manipulated by party structures dependent on identity politics for survival.1 
Post- independence Kosovo’s development is affected by unresolved status issues with 
Serbia, which has provided nearly a decade of tension during which both sides have 
managed to keep the conflict alive and resonant in the media and public space, while at 
the same time ensuring a lasting excuse for lagging reforms and a useful populist 
mobilizing tool.2  
 
The articles in this special issue each explore the dynamics of these transitions, focusing 
                                                        
1 On this issue see Jelena Džankić’s contribution in this special issue.  
2 See Soeren Keil’s contribution in this special issue.  
on the emergence of various forms of state capture that have developed over time. While 
the end of the Cold War – for a short-time at least – seemed to herald the “victory” of 
liberal democratic ideas accompanied by free market capitalism, it has become 
abundantly clear that there are many different forms of transitional political and 
economic models that can in fact fill the post-Communist vacuum. The contributions in 
this volume demonstrate that in the Western Balkans one can discern a spectrum of state 
capture where dynamics are in constant flux, and it is possible for a country’s position on 
the spectrum to change over time. 
The absence of a robust literature on state capture in the region provides ample room for 
both examining individual case studies, and, inter alia, theorizing broader trends and 
common characteristics. However it poses conceptual challenges as well, as no single 
model exists which can itself satisfactorily frame the various countries in the region. But 
there are commonalities in method and outcome, and state capture is not an accidental 
outcome, or an unintended phenomenon; it can represent a sophisticated and intentional 
system. One of the aims of this special issue is to study the characteristics of these 
systems, each of which exhibits certain functional rules (formal or informal), evolves in 
response to flaws and weaknesses, and builds on shared historical and developmental 
paths – paths often linked to political and social transition and efforts to overcome the 
results of the violent conflicts of the 1990s.  Each of the authors provides a different 
perspective on the issue in terms of both theory and case study reality, and in doing so 
begin to sketch out the practical institutional outcome of what Zakaria first termed 
“illiberal democracy” 20 years ago. The spectrum of state capture represents this 
unanticipated post-Cold War chimera on a continent on which many assumed the 
enlightenment values debate had been settled. 
 
Framing the Transition to State Capture 
 
The articles that follow sketch out key political and economic factors, but some 
overarching background is useful. Economic changes had begun in Yugoslavia before its 
violent political disintegration, as the country’s financial crisis, hastened by the beginning 
of the end of the Cold War, led to initial changes in the business/economic environment 
such as the so-called Marković reforms (Woodward 1995).3 In 1988, the Company Law 
was adopted, allowing socially-owned/state-owned companies to reorganize, merge, and 
to transfer social capital from one enterprise to another, thereby becoming mixed 
companies, holding both social and private capital. The 1989 Social Capital Circulation 
and Management Law, and subsequent amendments in 1990, were intended to hasten the 
process by introducing further market innovations, including the ability to issue shares in 
a company to employees. These and other reforms led to the bankruptcy of approximately 
1200 socially owned enterprises (Medjad 2004). As privatization was more aggressively 
introduced, different models were used in the different Yugoslav republics; Slovenia and 
Macedonia used a restitution approach; while BiH, Croatia and Serbia would later adopt a 
voucher method for early rounds, later turning to foreign investment (Ibid. 311).4 At the 
start, privatization occurred mainly with small and medium enterprises (SMEs), with 
little to no change in the larger socially-owned enterprises, meaning that many of the 
biggest and most lucrative assets remained in “government” hands during and after the 
wars.  
 
As political leadership changed hands, and as “communists” were quickly replaced with 
“nationalists,” there was a scramble to seize and hold assets as a part of national 
consolidation efforts – in times of both war and peace. This process was not inclusive, 
transparent or fair – it was crony capitalism thinly masquerading as an embrace of free 
market principles in the service of nation-building and war. The period also saw 
renationalization when it was convenient to shift so-called “socially owned” business to 
pure state control. For example:  
 
[In] Croatia, some 110 enterprises (mainly in infrastructure) were immediately 
transformed into state-owned firms run by government-appointed managers and were not 
subject to privatization (corresponding to around 40% of the value of all enterprises in 
social ownership). Some firms have also been nationalized in the guise of 'protecting 
                                                        
3 Ante Markovic was President of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, i.e. the head of government. 
4 For more on the Kosovo experience, see www.kta-kosovo.org  
national interests', such as the main oil company, which has the greatest assets and is the 
largest employer in Croatia, and the largest foreign trade company. In firms scheduled for 
privatization, workers did have the right to buy their enterprise assets on privileged 
conditions, but since real wages diminished sharply owing to high inflation, assets were 
in many cases seized by managers and directors (Dallago and Uvaslić 1998: 83).  
 
In Serbia,  
 
substantial parts of the economy have been renationalized, although there was no 
automatic transfer of unsold shares to state-owned institutions. By mid-1993 around 37% 
of the capital of social sector enterprises (mainly natural monopolies) had become state 
property. In privatizing social sector enterprises, as in Croatia, managers and workers 
were given the possibility to buy enterprise shares on privileged terms. However, since 
hyperinflation allowed the subscription and repayment of shares at ridiculously low real 
prices, the Democratic Party reacted by stressing the unfair outcome of privatization 
(Ibid.: 84).  
 
The ruling elites and their clients were the near sole benefactors of this free market 
shock; they enjoyed a first-mover advantage at a time when society as a whole was 
struggling through the social chaos, upheaval and displacement caused by violence and 
war. There were no checks and balances, no independent institutions, no counter-balances 
to resist or protest this asset seizure. 
 
A generation later, in spite of “progress” as the wars have ended, as the countries have 
joined the Council of Europe and other bodies as states in their own right, and as the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia have embarked on their individual European Union 
(EU) integration paths at various speeds, the region still seems to suffer from a shortage 
of both good governance and effective economic policy and development. Instead, for at 
least a decade it has been clear that the region is in many ways becoming less democratic, 
and more authoritarian in both political and economic outlook.5 This is the unfortunate 
                                                        
5 In May 2015 Kurt Bassuener noted, “I fear that the way the EU is approaching the Western 
Balkans is much the same as the way it is approaching the Southern Mediterranean—North Africa 
and the Middle East. That is, stability is paramount and trumps progress and democracy. As a result, 
but logical outcome of economic “wild West” liberalization in the absence of genuine 
political or institutional liberalization. 
 
While these outcomes have gained new relevance in terms of concerns of the rising 
economic dislocation and dissatisfaction at the core of growing populist movements in 
even seemingly functional democracies, the potential for such turmoil has been predicted 
for over two decades. Barber (1995) early on recognized the consequences of such an 
economic strategy in a world undergoing globalization while individual states struggled 
to build new identities in this new and very unbalanced world.  While his argument is 
global in nature, his analysis of the experience of these reforms in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union is particularly acute.  “[The] new transitional democracies have been talked 
by foreign advisors or bullied by international banks into thinking that laissez-faire 
capitalist economics is a self-sufficient social system. Predictably, the results have been 
catastrophic…. What Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls ‘savage capitalism’’ – a system 
‘fraught with unproductive, savage and repulsive forms of behaviour, the plunder of the 
nation’s wealth’ – has turned the new Russia into a place where ‘the brazen use of social 
advantage and the inordinate power of money (the very problems the collapse of 
communism was supposed to cure!) are today worse than ever” (Barber, 2001, 238-239). 
Magyar’s description of the impact of rapid-fire privatization in Hungary is similar in 
tone and content, as he notes, “… the opportunities for corruption were legion as the 
former state socialist countries rapidly privatized huge swaths of the economy in the 
1990s without a regulatory regime in place to oversee and regularize the privatization” 
(Magyar, 2016, xix). George Soros, no stranger to global financial maneuvering, has 
referred to unquestioned capitalist orthodoxy and the premise that markets are perfect and 
perfectly self-regulating as “market fundamentalism” (2008). Glenny (2008) has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the union risks aligning itself with increasingly illiberal and authoritarian regimes and figures by 
default, and mistaking their power for stability.” “Judy Asks: Is the EU Sleeping on the Western 
Balkans?” Carnegie Europe. 13 May 2015. Available at 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60069. See also for a more recent assessment: 
BiEPAG 2017.  
 
 
examined the impact of economic globalization and market development in terms of 
transnational organized crime, a trend that has always demonstrated the entrepreneurial 
faculties of its participants, but which with the massive influx of cash and assets in the 
1990s privatization wave (and financial deregulation that eased money laundering) 
suddenly enjoyed access to more money and political clout than previously possible. The 
analyses by Barber, Magyar, Soros and Glenny would all ring true to the average citizen 
of each of the countries under consideration in this collection, who has witnessed these 
processes in real-time and first-hand. 
 
This special issue goes to the heart of this matter, examining the real-world result of 
gravely flawed transitions through a combination of thematic comparative analyses and 
case studies. As will be demonstrated across the contributions, in order to understand 
state capture in the former Yugoslav states, it is important to go beyond the classical 
definition of state capture as efforts by individuals, groups, or firms, both in the public 
and private sectors, to shape the laws, policies, regulations, decrees, and other 
government policies for their own advantage and gain (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 
2000). Instead, as several authors point out throughout this special issue, state capture in 
the Western Balkans focuses on government elites and their grip on power. They use 
political, social and economic means to extend their own influence and ensure their 
dominant position in these transitional political systems. While corruption is an important 
dimension in this discussion, it is by far not sufficient to theorize and evaluate 
developments in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as both John Hulsey and Joseph 
Coelho point out in their contributions. Indeed, in order to understand state capture in the 
countries under examination different perspectives have to be taken into account. First, as 
discussed above, economic liberalization and political change occurred at a time of 
regime change and violence in many of these countries. This opened doors for political 
and economic elites to take a dominant position in both realms, thereby ensuring that 
economic and political “liberalization” would be framed in a way that would suit their 
interests and not threaten their position. Montenegro is probably the most obvious 
example of this development, as pointed in out in the papers by Soeren Keil and Jelena 
Džankić. Second, the period after the violent conflicts, in which democratization and 
state-building by international actors dominated numerous countries, paved the way for 
certain elites to not only clinch their existing dominant position, but also to extend their 
power by manipulating external actors and the processes of state-building and 
democratization in their favor. This has already been discussed in detail in previous work 
we completed on Bosnia and Herzegovina (Keil and Perry 2015), and it is discussed by 
Joseph Coelho in his case study of Kosovo. Third, existing ethnic divisions and the 
continued contestation of numerous countries and their political systems have further 
allowed actors to take control of political, social and economic institutions, as Jelena 
Džankić details.  
 
Looking at these wider issues raises of course the question of what can be done to 
counterbalance state capture and new authoritarian tendencies in the region. Some 
authors in this special issue focus on the role of the EU and its conditionality. Others 
point out that only deep-rooted reforms that lead to the establishment of functional 
countries in which the rule of law is respected will help in overcoming existing problems. 
However, as John Hulsey reminds us in his paper, once state capture has become system-
endemic, it is very hard to get rid of. Recent developments in Macedonia, where a semi-
authoritarian government has been toppled in elections and through street protests, 
demonstrate that change might be possible. It remains, however, to be seen if the new 
government in Skopje will be able to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors, particularly 
when it comes to tackling corruption, ensuring more transparency in government policy 
and strengthening the rule of law.      
 
Contributions to this Special Issue 
 
John Hulsey’s paper provides some theoretical framing for this special issue. Looking at 
state capture in Bosnia in comparative perspective, he points out that the 
conceptualization of state capture is very difficult, and that many of the indicators often 
used might be problematic. Instead, he argues, we should focus on the current structure of 
the political system and the role of political elites in it. How did they come to power? 
Which resources can they mobilize, both to get into power, and to stay in power? How 
closely are economic, societal and political systems linked and indeed mixed? Discussing 
the case of BiH, he demonstrates how after the war parties representing the three main 
ethnic groups in the country have been able to dominate economic and political systems 
in the territory of “their ethnic group,” while at the same time working together at the 
central level to ensure that the joint resources are shared equally between the main parties. 
The lack of party competition across ethnic lines, and power-sharing institutions that 
support extreme and exclusive political positions, as well as a lack of the rule of law have 
further contributed to the current situation in Bosnia. Hulsey provides a wider discussion 
of what constitutes state capture and how it could (and should) be tackled.  
 
David Kanin provides a provocative contribution, questioning the assumption that non-
patronage based systems are achievable, reasonable or even desirable in the Balkans.  He 
argues that it is Quixotic to assume that external incentives can change trust networks that 
he argues have existed in the region for generations.  In this reading of past and recent 
history, so-called patronage networks are simply an informal yet, in Kanin’s view, 
effective way of organizing society. The “in groups” and “out groups” that may emerge 
from such a system are in effect no different than those one may find in parliamentary 
systems that result in certain parties enjoying power while others remain mired in 
opposition. He suggests that to question the legitimacy of these systems is neo-colonial 
and even patronizing, revealing an ignorance of informal social practices.  Kanin aims to 
challenge the conventional wisdom among “western” powers promoting so-called 
traditional norms of liberal democracy and good governance. When taken in the context 
of global events in 2017 some key ideas deserve consideration: is it in fact the case that 
nepotism is the norm, and meritocratic bureaucracies are the exception? Are bribes just 
another measure of how much someone values something, akin to a market price? And, 
in the context of EU enlargement, should the EU expect that new members adjust to 
Brussels-articulated norms, or be prepared to bend to these different practices? If the 
latter is the case, then what is the future of enlargement? 
 
Soeren Keil’s article provides a comparative view of state capture trends and practices in 
four countries: Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. After providing a 
framework for democratization and authoritarian backsliding, he considers four 
constitutive parts that have heretofore provided a backbone for liberal governance – the 
separation of powers, the role of bureaucracies and independent agencies, the strength of 
civil society and an independent media and the tone and content of policy making – to 
explore how the cases under consideration have to varying extents whittled away the 
“checks and balances” elements required to ensure an effective counter-weight against 
authoritarian instincts held by any one party/coalition or individual leader. He also 
crucially links the process of state capture – regardless of the extent or success of the 
phenomenon – to illiberal and authoritarian trends in these countries. At a time when 
even members of the EU – most notably Hungary and Poland – are moving away from 
the liberal values that have provided the foundation for the European project, these trends 
in potential future members is troubling, leading to questions about not only their future 
integration into the EU, but also the net gain that such countries could contribute to a 
union that seems less and less rooted in a shard sense of norms and values. 
 
Jelena Džankić analyzes three countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Montenegro – according to two dimensions (one internal, and one external) that have 
enabled and facilitated state capture. The internal factor reflects ongoing unresolved 
identity issues that have been effectively exploited and manipulated by ethnic 
entrepreneurs to facilitate continued divisions that enable the maintenance of 
unaccountable and often illiberal systems. The external factor is related to the continued 
external contestation of these sovereign states that unsettles both their domestic and 
foreign policies and posture.  Two of these cases can point to internationally brokered 
agreements as at least a partial source of this instability. In BiH the Dayton Agreement 
created a structure that put a premium on ethno-national control in the electoral system 
and virtually all levels of governance, via the territorial administrative division in the 
country and the legitimation of the notion of three constituent peoples within these sub-
state units.  In Macedonia, the Ohrid Agreement created a different dynamic than that 
seen in BiH, but one that is still rife with tensions, trading accountable governance and 
representation for fragile political party interest-based coalitions.  Montenegro, compared 
to these other cases, enjoys a certain amount of normalcy. However, the attempted coup 
in 2016 and the continued tensions with Serbia and Russia provide outside destabilizing 
influences. Džankić argues that these “structural anomalies” facilitate elite capture, and 
weaken processes of democratic consolidation that could otherwise serve as checks and 
balances. She focuses on two processes that have unfolded in these post-communist 
environments  - the development of public administration systems that have served as an 
opportunity to stock one’s “own” within the pool, according to ethno-national and/or 
party lines; and privatization processes which uniformly unfolded in a non-transparent 
and often closed manner, building an elite capable of entrenching and reproducing. 
 
Joseph Coelho’s detailed case study of Kosovo echoes a number of these themes, while 
adding the role and impact of the significant international presence in Kosovo. He finds 
that the intentional administration played both a direct and indirect role in if not creating 
the conditions for state capture, then in facilitating the conditions necessary for state 
capture.  Methods used have included the misuse or improper channeling of foreign aid to 
existing or emerging clients, privatization under questionable procedures and the 
legitimization of unaccountable politicians unwilling to denounce conflict or interest and 
overt corruption by international partners – primarily the EU and the US – desperate for 
stability. He explains this by applying the stability paradigm to Kosovo, explaining how 
the west’s prioritization of stability over potentially destabilizing application of the rule 
of law and accountable politics have created a minimally accountable and generally 
corrupt system in Europe’s newest country. While Kosovo continues to fail to adequately 
address the concerns of its Serbs (a tension abetted by the role of Belgrade in seeking 
some sort of de facto Serb entity within Kosovo), its lack of BiH- or Macedonia like 
ethno-national problems demonstrate that the drivers of the conditions for state capture 
depend just as much on structural deficiencies, the lack of checks and balances and a 








Together, the articles in this issue will contribute to needed debate. Global discussions on 
economic inequality, the ineffectiveness of governance, and the unsuitability of political 
party options have resulted in a variety of developments, ranging from the emotionally 
driven citizen choices in support of Brexit and the election of Donald J. Trump as US 
president, to the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as an outsider candidate interested in 
reshaping France’s domestic systems while also supporting the EU. While the famous 
saying “We live in interesting times” might be more relevant than many would want it to 
be, it is nevertheless important to think about what these developments mean. For 
example, the discussion about state capture in the former Yugoslavia could be put in a 
wider framework, challenging the liberal internationalist paradigm that has dominated 
international relations for years, and which saw American hegemony, democracy 
promotion and support for economic liberalization at its core. Has support for free market 
capitalism in the absence of a structure supporting the rule of law led to economic 
liberalization without political liberalization? Furthermore, it could be argued that state 
capture in the region is enabled by the re-emergence of the Eastern Question, with Russia 
supporting semi-authoritarian leaders in Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika 
Srpska, and Turkey, the Gulf states and China playing a more prominent role in the 
region as well. Finally, as the EU is overcoming the Brexit shock and still dealing with 
the refugee crisis, the future of enlargement, and indeed of the EU as a political project, 
remains in question as more inward-focused right-leaning parties are elected to office on 
anti-status quo platforms.  
Yet, while the picture that the authors in this special issue paint might seem bleak, there 
are counterbalancing processes at work as well. Citizen protests occurred in all former 
Yugoslav countries. In Macedonia, they have recently demonstrated that they can 
influence government policy and indeed overcome the false stability of the new semi-
authoritarian regimes; however the future is far from certain. Civil society faces 
unexpected challenges, as an alternative illiberal version of it is emerging in the region 
with support from the right (and the governments itself) and an agenda seemingly 
opposed to the liberal enlightenment values espoused by the EU. Whether this trend will 
in the long term meaningfully strengthen civil society and citizen agency in the broad 
sense, or represent one more element of state capture, remains to be seen.  Likewise, the 
emergence of new political parties and new political elites such as Saša Janković in 
Serbia, who focus on economic liberalism and democratic governance, can also be 
observed in some countries, though the impact to date remains limited.  
 
Kanin’s thought-provoking article perhaps forces anyone interested in these issues to 
return to first principles. Is it in fact possible that western liberal approaches to political 
and civic life are simply neither relevant to nor desired by the vast majority of people 
living in this region? Is the status quo in fact more “legitimate” than one might think, 
explaining the continued electoral success of the same people and the same parties year 
after year? And if this is the case, then how can one reconcile this with future region-
wide EU membership, and the (presumed) commitments to good governance, the rule of 
law and anti-corruption initiatives expected of its members? 
Even if agreeing with Kanin’s argument, and accepting that non-patronage based 
societies are a global exception rather than the norm, unless a captured state and its 
patronage system is so pervasive and all-encompassing that the vast majority are 
satisfactorily included within it, there will always be an outside group, either vying to 
displace the present “insiders” within the same system, or perhaps seeking a system that 
would not require an out-group at all. Such an “outgroup” can either be co-opted through 
the expansion of patronage networks, marginalized as opposition or challenged as an 
undesirable social option (perhaps through labelling such groups as Soros-funded foreign 
agents), draping the status quo in concepts of patriotic tradition. Such systems may or 
may not be sustainable in the long term.  
A few options can provide some food for thought for future work on this topic in the 
region. 
First, if the EU enlargement processes to date have illustrated anything, it is that Brussels 
enjoys precious few tools to sanction, encourage or otherwise respond to unpalatable 
state actions once they become a member.  Hungary and Poland are often first noted, but 
other countries (Cyprus, Greece) are also straining the EU’s institutions, values and 
norms; the response by Brussels to such developments among its members remains 
uncertain. This does demonstrate however that it is important to ensure that reforms made 
during the accession process are meaningful and deep, and are not only adopted but 
effectively implemented, with genuinely independent structures and systems able to 
ensure lasting enforcement. This will not be easy; critics will suggest that strict 
conditionality amounts to changing the terms of accession, and that it is better to have 
these countries inside the tent as soon as possible [(Chandler 2010; Jovic 2015). However, 
allowing new weak states to become members will not only not help citizens in those 
countries, but will contribute to enlargement-fatigue and disillusionment in the Union as 
a whole (Keil and Arkan 2014), as citizens and their representatives wonder why they are 
suddenly bound with countries that have failed to meaningfully reform.  
 
The fact that this will be difficult leads directly to a second recommendation. As Hulsey 
explains, there are substantial obstacles to changing systems that have begun to 
internalize aspects of state capture into formal and informal governance structures.  
Parties and politicians will inherently reject reforms if they feel that they would be 
“losing” according to the current rules of the game. Opposition voices, often facing an 
uphill battle in the best of circumstances, have failed to effectively make their case, 
making it still easier for the status quo to calcify. The EU and other external actors would 
do well to more aggressively speak directly to the citizens of prospective members states, 
and to more assiduously make an effort to cultivate positive domestic forces supportive 
of more open and accountable governance. In tandem, supporters of open, liberal systems 
should be encouraged to look at the systems and structures in their societies to determine 
what makes them accountable, and what additional incentives could be introduced to 
increase the accountability link between citizens and officials elected or appointed to 
serve.  
 
This leads to a third recommendation, related to the values of the EU and its members, 
and more broadly, the values of the liberal, democratic West.  Has the West lost the 
values debate, not only in the region but more broadly? This is a discussion that will not 
only continue but likely accelerate as increasing and deep dissatisfaction seems to sweep 
the consolidated democracies and transitional countries alike. The socio-economic pain 
stemming from the 2008 financial crisis reflected not only structural weaknesses in the 
global financial infrastructure, but also growing social dissatisfaction with government 
responses. Rising economic inequality and overall social insecurity have made other 
social fears (immigration, heterogeneous societies, the “other”) more poignant. The UK 
vote for Brexit was more a reflection of these concerns (and their exploitation) than the 
merits of EU membership, and the election of Donald Trump in the US, and his 
presidency to date, send similarly contradictory signals, reflecting an inchoate populism 
grounded in the sense that the economic system that seemed to bring great post- World 
War II growth is no longer delivering for the average citizen.  This inward looking 
populism naturally has an impact on states’ foreign policies as well, and, in an 
environment in which there is a security vacuum in terms of global leadership, provides 
ample opportunity for different actors with different agendas to assert themselves in 
hybrid ways in the Balkans – the most notable such actor in this instance being Russia. 
(Bassuener and Perry 2017). 
 
It remains to be seen how countries in the region – or the world in general - will face 
these social challenges. Will more authoritarian models such as in China be viewed as 
preferable?  Will citizens be willing to trade certain basic values of openness and 
transparency in exchange for infrastructure, real (or promised) rapid annual growth, 
better living conditions, etc.? Or will be there be a tipping a point when people decide 
that in addition to economic benefit they want political freedoms, independent institutions 
and accountable governments? While the countries in the Balkans have experienced their 
tumultuous political and economic flux over the past generation, resulting in various 
manifestations of state capture that reflect specific institutional and social weaknesses, 
the challenges and temptations are not unique to the region, and in fact can be expected to 
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